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2THE NEED FOR COMPREHENSIVENESS AND INCREASED ENFORCEABILITY IN THE
STANDARDIZATION1 OF INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATIONS
I.
INTRODUCTION
Sovereign nations have the responsibility to protect the health and well-being of their constituents. This
responsibility manifests itself in an often staunch defense of national pharmaceutical regulations, developed
to protect citizens from unsafe products. However, diﬀerences in regulatory systems across countries cre-
ate barriers to trade in pharmaceuticals. As the world becomes increasingly interconnected, barriers to
trade seem increasingly anachronistic. The economic and social beneﬁts from reducing impediments to
inter-nation trade are indisputable. This principle holds true for the pharmaceutical industry, in which lib-
eralization would produce enormous beneﬁts for industry and consumer alike. In recognition of the beneﬁts
of internationalization, many nations are moving towards eliminating non-tariﬀ barriers to trade through
standardization of their pharmaceutical regulatory systems.
This article will discuss the main mechanisms by which the United States and other countries are attempting
to standardize their pharmaceutical regulations. I ﬁrst explore the need for standardization and the potential
1The word more commonly used to include all the mechanisms to be discussed, “harmonization,” has diﬀerent meanings
for diﬀerent people in the pharmaceutical arena. For example, some people use “harmonization” interchangeably with “mutual
recognition agreements,” a mechanism which I will discuss separately. See Barbara Indech, The International Harmonization
of Human Tissue Regulation: Regulatory Control over Human Tissue Use and Tissue Banking in Select Countries and the
Current State of International Harmonization Eﬀorts, 55 Food & Drug L.J. 343, 366 (2000). Others use “harmonization” to
refer to all mechanisms of aligning country regulatory practices, while still others use “harmonization” as a distinct mechanism
alignment. I use the word “standardization” to include all the mechanisms to be discussed to avoid the confusion that may
result from the use of a term with no standardized deﬁnition.
3beneﬁts that standardization oﬀers. Then I sketch the early eﬀorts of nations to move toward standard-
ization. I present and critique the mechanisms by which standardization is currently proceeding and the
progress that has been made to date. I also detail the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) participation
in international standardization.
I argue that reform of the standardization process is necessary to reap the full beneﬁts of standardization.
Speciﬁcally, the various tools of standardization, the ICH, MRAs, and MOUs need to be integrated so as not
to work at cross-purposes. The standardization process must be expanded to account for the views of con-
sumers and non-member nations. Most importantly, in the absence of a way to bind nations to commitments
to standardize pharmaceutical regulations, standardization mechanism are in danger of becoming another
layer of regulatory delay; to avoid this pitfall, standardization agreements must be made enforceable.
II.
BACKGROUND
A.
The Need for Standardization
Standardization of pharmaceutical regulations will beneﬁt consumers and producers alike, by bringing ef-
fective treatments to market faster and reducing the costs of drug development. Developing a drug for
marketing is an extraordinarily costly process, both in money and time. One estimate places the average
costs to develop a prescription drug at an average of $802 million.2 Bringing a drug to market takes between
2See Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development
4ten and ﬁfteen years in the United States.3 The rising costs of drug development have been attributed to
spiraling clinical trial costs.4
Historically, each country has had its own standards for regulating pharmaceuticals marketed in that country.
The FDA for example, requires several phases of testing, as laid out in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (FDCA), before allowing a drug to be sold to the public.5 Individual countries often require that domestic
legal and regulatory standards be met even if a drug is already widely marketed in another or several other
countries.6 Thus, for the FDA to approve a drug for use in the United States, a domestic investigator must
sometimes replicate the results of experiments already conducted in the drug’s country of origin.7 Such
requirements necessitate that a drug undergo expensive and time-consuming clinical trials to satisfy each
agency from which approval is sought.8
Pegs Cost of a New Prescription Medicine at $802 Million, News Release (November 30, 2001), at www.
tufts.edu/med/csdd/images/NewsRelease113001pm.pdf, visited on March 10, 2002. This study updates one done ten years
ago, in which costs of bringing a drug to market averaged $231 million in 1987 dollars. Had inﬂation been the only cause of
increased cost, the amount to bring a drug to market would be $318 million in 2000 dollars. See Id.
3See id.
4See id. The Tufts Center study found that while costs increased in inﬂation-adjusted terms for all R&D phases, there were
particularly dramatic increases for the clinical period. The inﬂation-adjusted annual growth rate for capitalized clinical costs
(11.8%) was more than ﬁve times greater than that for pre-clinical R&D. See id.
5See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §301 et seq (1999). To be marketed in the United States, a drug
must be approved by the FDA after review of a New Drug Application (NDA). The NDA must include the results of at least
two controlled clinical trials. In the NDA, proposed labeling must be supported by data showing the safety of the recommended
uses and any potential side eﬀects or contraindictions associated with usage of the drug. Post-marketing reports of any adverse
reactions must be submitted to the FDA periodically, and manufacturing plants are subject to FDA inspection. See Thomas
M. Moore and Siobhan A. Cullen. Impact of Global Pharmaceutical Regulations on U.S. Products Liability Exposure, 66 Def.
Couns. J. 101, 102-103 (1999).
6However, developing countries usually accept approvals from the United States and other developed countries.
7See Michelle D. Miller, The Informed-Consent Policy of the International Conference on Harmonization of Technical
Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for human Use: Knowledge is the Best Medicine, 30 Cornell Int’l L.J. 203,
205 (1997). However, the FDA now does approve some drugs based on foreign trials. See Eric M. Katz, Europe’s Centralized
New Drug Procedures: Is the United States Prepared to Keep Pace? 48 Food & Drug L.J. 577, 581 (1993). 21 CFR
§312.120(a) states that the FDA accepts foreign clinical studies not conducted under an IND as long as they are “well designed,
well conducted, performed by qualiﬁed investigators, and conducted in accordance with ethical principles acceptable to the
world community.” 21 CFR §312.120. §312.120(b)-(c) set out the information to be submitted to the FDA in order to rely on
foreign studies to support an application. However, if marketing approval of a new drug is to be based solely on foreign clinical
data, §314.106 states that approval may be granted only if “(1) The foreign data are applicable to the U.S. population and U.S.
medical practice; (2) the studies have been performed by clinical investigators of recognized competence; and (3) the data may
be considered valid without the need for an on-site inspection by FDA or, if FDA considers such an inspection to be necessary,
FDA is able to validate the data through an on-site inspection or other appropriate means.” Id.
8See Paul M. Booth, FDA Implementation of Standards Developed by the International Conference on Harmonisation, 52
Food & Drug L.J. 203, 203 (1997).
5Regulatory delays have detrimental eﬀects on potential consumers. Economists and doctors worry that
patients will not be able to gain access to life-enhancing and possibly life-saving treatments as cheaply or
quickly.9 Patients who would be willing to take the risks and use new drugs before they are approved by
the FDA lose the potential therapeutic beneﬁts they might have received.10 Supporters of standardization
see the FDA drug regulatory process as inordinately cautious and decry FDA resistance to reducing the
stringency of the requirements for drug approval. After Thalimide and other disasters, the FDA developed
drug regulations in deference to the public’s refusal to sacriﬁce safety for cost eﬀectiveness.11 Critics of the
FDA assert that such caution is causing more deaths than it prevents, by delaying access of Americans to
life-saving drugs.12
However, these eﬀects are diﬃcult to quantify, and as such fail to spur action to the same extent as do
reports of adverse eﬀects of drugs.13 A study of therapeutic loss conducted over twenty years ago, concluded
that the increased stringency in drug approval by the FDA after 1962 caused a decrease in drug innovation
in the United States. The therapeutic loss resulting from FDA regulation was estimated at over $450 million
per year.14 More recent studies posit that regulatory delays negatively impact patient life expectancy and
quality of life.15 While a drug that produced fatalities of this magnitude would be seen as catastrophic, this
9See Teresa Pechulis Buono, Biotechnology-Derived Pharmaceuticals: Harmonizing Regional Regulations, 18 Suﬀolk
Transnat’l L. Rev. 133, 134 (1995).
10See Note, FDA Reform and the European Medicines Evaluation Agency, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 2009, 2013 (1995).
11Michelle D. Miller, The Informed-Consent Policy of. 30 Cornell Int’l L.J. 203, 233. See id. Part I.A.2. for a more
complete detailing of these pharmaceutical disasters.
12John Patrick Dillman, Prescription Drug Approval and Terminal Diseases: Desperate Times Require Desperate Measures,
44 Vand. L. Rev. 925, 939. May, 1991
13See id. at 2011.
14See id. at 2013.
15See id. at 2014. One estimate suggests that 8,000 to 15,000 patients died from gastric ulcers while the FDA was considering
the NDA for misoprostol, a drug used to treat that condition. Also, in the ﬁve years in which the drug nitrazepam was approved
in Britain but not in the Unites States, pharmacologists argue that millions of lives could’ve been saved. See id.
6therapeutic loss has been largely ignored.
The necessity to comply with the incompatible regulations of various agencies has negative implications for
industry, as well as consumers. Faced with the costs of duplicative research trials, pharmaceutical companies
raise their prices, take longer to introduce drugs into the market, or choose not to enter some markets.16
Regulatory inconsistencies across countries prevent pharmaceutical companies from developing globally ac-
ceptable product designs, manufacturing processes, packaging and labeling.17 Due to the additional expense
to pharmaceutical companies in complying with multiple regulatory schemes, these companies are less likely
to pursue global markets.18 Further, the increased lag time between development and distribution of a prod-
uct due to standards that diﬀer across nation increases industry costs through lost sales revenue, decrease
in eﬀective patent life, lost working capital, and wages of worker hours to process multiple applications.19
Decreasing proﬁts from drug sales reduce the incentive for multinational companies to develop new pharma-
ceuticals.
Ability of drugs to enter overseas markets is hampered by the need for often duplicative studies to meet
the requirements of the domestic agency charged with regulating pharmaceuticals in each country. The
signiﬁcant up-front costs to companies of learning the distinct regulations of another market force small
drug companies from developing new drugs.20 Drug approval time for companies that do seek to enter
foreign markets is lengthened.21 Furthermore, the pharmaceutical industry argues that replicating trials
already conducted in a foreign country is too expensive given its doubtful value.22 Increases in international
16See Ileana Dominguez-Urban, Harmonization in the Regulation of Pharmaceutical Research and Human Rights: The Need
to Think Globally, 30 Cornell Int’l L.J. 245, 245. (1997)
17See Moore and Cullen, supra note 5, at 102.
18See Buono, supra note 9, at 134.
19See Rosemarie Kanusky, Pharmaceutical Harmonization: Standardizing Regulations among the United States, the European
Economic Community, and Japan, 16 Hous. J. Int’l L. 665, 703-704 (1994).
20See id. at 704.
21See Buono, supra note 9, at 134.
22See Miller, supra note 7, at 205.
7trade also strain already overextended regulatory resources.23
Reduction or obliteration of the necessity of complying with diﬀerent regulatory regimes would beneﬁt both
consumers and producers. For consumers, standardization would remove the obstacles to patients accessing
aﬀordable, eﬀective curative treatments. Beside lowering health care costs and providing faster access for
the public to new treatments, international consensus on regulations would enhance international public
health as the best of each country’s health system is meshed together.24 Furthermore, a global response
is needed since disease recognizes no national borders.25 For companies, standardization will bring about
greater revenue from sales of pharmaceuticals as drugs go on the market much sooner.26 In the United
States, if regulatory approval time is reduced by one year, drugs can generate proﬁts three to four years
earlier as the costs of maintaining a drug in the absence of proﬁts would be decreased and proﬁts would
accrue sooner. Six months less of review time could generate savings of millions of dollars for companies that
can be reinvested in research.27 U.S. companies might choose to locate more manufacturing and research
facilities in the United States in the absence of the myriad of regulations that have driven them overseas.28
Standardization will facilitate simultaneous introduction of a new drug in various countries as well as intra-
company globalization of procedures across the global organization, particularly for clinical study protocols
and reports.29 Regulators would be more eﬃcient given the beneﬁt of the experiences of their counterparts
23See Alexander M. Donahue, Equivalence: Not Quite Close Enough for the International Harmonization of Environmental
Standards, 30 Envtl. L. 363, 366 (2000).
24See Jane E. Henney, U.S. Food and Drug Administration Commissioner of Food and Drugs, Keynote Ad-
dress at the Global Harmonization Task Force Meeting in Bethesda, Maryland (June 29, 1999), available at
<www.fda.gov/oc/speeches/globalharm.html> (visited March 12, 2002).
25See Dominguez-Urban, supra note 16, at 247. For example, when antibiotics in developing countries are used in inadequate
dosages and for inadequate periods, drug-resistant strains of bacteria are created, which then spread across national boundaries.
See id. at 249.
26See Kanusky, supra note 19, at 704.
27See id.
28See Patrick Dillman, Prescription Drug Approval and Terminal Diseases: Desperate Times Require Desperate Measures,
44 Vand. L. Rev. 925, 937 (1991).
29See Caroline Nutley, The Value and Beneﬁts of ICH to Industry, 2, 5 (2000), at
http://www.ifpma.org/pdﬁfpma/ValueBeneﬁts.pdf (visited March 13, 2002).
8in other countries.30
Ascertaining the safety of new drugs does not require that each country maintain a disparate regulatory
approval system. Rather, various mechanisms of harmonization can reduce the costs, detailed above, of
multiple regulatory systems, while still ensuring consumer safety. In fact, in pressing single-mindedly for
greater regulation of pharmaceuticals, consumer advocates often labor under the mistaken impression that
more strictures necessarily result in increased safety. However, greater control of drug production may not
improve drug safety.31 Standardization aims to create safer pharmaceuticals by distilling the shared wisdom
of multiple regulatory systems into a more eﬀective drug development and approval process, in which some
tests might even be decreased or eliminated.32
B.
Early Attempts at Standardization
Regulatory authorities have been under increasing pressure to standardize the drug approval process. Reg-
ulatory agencies must operate in an increasingly complex economy, one in which the health industry, and
the multinational companies that dominate it, is a powerful force. Such multinational companies would
prefer to submit one application to one regulatory body for approval to market a drug. The rapid pace of
technological change challenges regulatory agencies to ﬁt new models of therapeutics into existing systems.
Resource constraints in the face of new technologies require innovative solutions and collaboration on behalf
30See Henney, supra note 24.
31See Kanusky, supra note 19, at 706.
32Id. at 688.
9of regulators. In a world in which international activities are increasingly important, collaborative strategies
are becoming ever more necessary for regulators.33
The movement towards standardization of pharmaceutical regulations was presaged by the movement to
standardize food regulations. Speciﬁcally, in 1962 the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) jointly established the Codex Alimentarius Commission
(Codex), an international standard-setting body intended to facilitate international trade of food and to
ensure that the world’s food supply is sound, wholesome, and properly labeled.34 All members and associate
members of the WHO and FAO can become members in the Codex.35 Codex sets descriptive standards for
foods so that the 162 member nations all have the same understanding of what constitutes a given food. 36
Since its establishment, Codex has promulgated over 250 international food standards. These standards are
developed by Codex’s fourteen subsidiary commodities committees and eight broader committees that deal
with more general subjects, such as the Codex Committee on Food Additives and Contaminants. After
adoption by Codex, food standards are promoted to member nations for their acceptance.37 Member coun-
tries and nongovernment organizations (NGOs) can comment freely on food standards under development
in the Codex committees, allowing the food industry to work with government oﬃcials and within NGOs to
forge a uniﬁed position. The structure and operating principles of Codex are reﬂected in the ICH.38
Codex standards are not binding on member nations.39 In recognition of its members’ sovereignty, countries
33See Therapeutic Products Programme’s International Strategy, Key Trends Shaping the Current International Envi-
ronment, at http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hpb-dgps/therapeut/zfiles/english/strategy/int-stra e.html (visited January 27,
2002).
34See Lucinda Sikes, FDA’s Consideration of Codex Alimentarius Standards in Light of International Trade Agreements, 53
Food & Drug L.J. 327, 328 (1998).
35See John S. Eldred and Shirley A. Coﬃeld, What Every Food Manufacturer Needs to Know: Realizing the Impact of
Globalization on National Food Regulation, 52 Food & Drug L.J. 31, 31-32 (1997).
36See Sikes, supra note 34, at 328.
37See Eldred and Coﬃeld, supra note 35, at 32.
38See text pp. 38-40. For a detailed description of the Codex process for promulgating standards, see
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OA/codex/operate.htm, visited on March 11, 2002.
39See Sikes, supra note 34, at 328.
10are allowed to decide what parts of the international standards, if any, they will adopt, with Codex mem-
bership entailing no obligation to follow any Codex standard or guideline.40 For example, the FDA does
not view the Codex standards as binding safety standards.41 Nonetheless, the U.S. Codex, the organization
comprising government oﬃcials from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), and the Environmental Protection Agency which manages and implements United States involve-
ment in Codex, aims to strengthen Codex as a means of fostering adherence to Codex standards to realize
the economic beneﬁts of standardization.42
In a recent change in policy, Codex standards have been given “teeth.” Members of the World Trade Orga-
nization (WTO) are now obligated to incorporate Codex food standards into their national regulations and
such standards are persuasive authority under the WTO dispute resolution structure.43 Member nations are
allowed to develop more stringent requirements than those proposed by Codex, but these standards may be
challenged under the WTO as disguised trade barriers.44
Other than Codex, various multilateral eﬀorts to regulate the food supply set the precedent for international
cooperation that ultimately spread to the pharmaceutical industry. For example, in an attempt to address
common problems, FDA oﬃcials met semiannually in the 1970s with representatives of the regulatory bodies
of Canada and Britain to discuss problems facing one country that for which the other countries might be
at risk. These discussions led to some collaborative attempts to deal with shared threats. One such collab-
40See Eldred and Coﬃeld, supra note 35, at 34.
4121 C.F.R. § 130.6 (a), Review of Codex Alimentarius food standards, states that “[a]ll food standards adopted by the
Codex Alimentarius Commission will be reviewed by the Food and Drug Administration and will be accepted without change,
accepted with change, or not accepted.”
42See Eldred and Coﬃeld, supra note 35, at 32. The US Codex generated a Strategic Plan asserting that: 1) The United
States should support the eﬀorts of the Codex and other international organizations to improve the scientiﬁc basis for Codex
standards, so that these standards may be based consistently on sound scientiﬁc analysis and evidence; 2) the United States
should support eﬀorts to improve Codex management processes in order to enhance the Commission’s credibility with national
regulatory authorities and consumers; 3) the United States should step up its commitment to systematically and routinely
evaluate Codex standards for acceptance as the basis for U.S. standards; 4) the U.S. Codex should encourage and enable all
signiﬁcantly interested nongovernmental bodies to participate actively in Codex activities; and 5) the U.S. Codex should be
allocated suﬃcient resources to eﬀectively carry out its mission. See Oﬃce of the U.S. Coordinator for Codex Alimentarius,
U.S. Codex Strategic Plan (Draft Plan), ii-iii (1995).
43See Eldred and Coﬃeld, supra note 35, at 33.
44See id. at 34.
11oration was the joint eﬀort to evaluate a Canadian study on saccharine.45
Likewise, the common nature of many issues involved in drug regulation led to similarities in solutions
across countries even prior to formal standardizations attempts. Speciﬁcally, all countries needed to re-
spond to public pressure for increased speed in getting eﬀective and safe treatments to those in need in the
face of rising drug development and research costs.46 Subject to these conditions, decisions that regulatory
regimes in all countries need to make include: how to balance increased speed of approval with protecting
the public against potential hazards; whether to focus on safety and innovation or on proven eﬃcacy; and
whether to measure value of a drug in terms of clinical beneﬁts or a narrower evaluation of factors such as
cost-eﬀectiveness or protection of domestic producers.47
Although not necessarily to the same degree, all countries have to deal with the abovementioned issues, with
the likelihood that they will gravitate toward some similar solutions. 48 This remains true even though an
issue of particular prominence in one country may be faced to a lesser degree by other countries’ regulatory
bodies. For example, Japan focused on fostering innovation and attention to physiologic distinctiveness;
the U.K. has been concerned with regulatory secrecy and conﬂicts of interest; the Unites States has had
particular problems with the demands of political constituencies and balancing rapid approval with societal
safety; and France has had to deal with the treatment of alternative medicines and the impact of regulations
on local industry.49 An example of the arrival at similar solutions to a similar problem despite diﬀerential
emphases includes the FDA’s fee structure to make drug registration applicants fund their own registration
process.50 Such a system is similar to the United Kingdom institution of self-ﬁnancing regulatory agencies
45See Richard A. Merrill, FDA and Mutual Recognition Agreements: Five Models of Harmonization, 53 Food & Drug L.J.
133, 133 (1998).
46See Indech, supra note 1, at 368.
47See Bryan L. Walser, Shared Technical Decisionmaking and the Disaggregation of Sovereignty: International Regulatory
Policy, Expert Communities, and the Multinational Pharmaceutical Industry, 72 Tul. L. Rev. 1597, 1640-1641 (1998).
48See id. at 1642.
49See id.
50See id.
12(sefras), agencies licensed by government that make regulation a business by charging those regulated for
their regulation services.51
The process of similar solutions developing in response to similar problems is self-reinforcing.52 Once similar
solutions are chosen, the divergence between the regulatory regimes in diﬀerent countries is reduced. Coun-
tries with more convergent background regimes as the context for regulatory decision-making are even more
likely to make similar choices.
Early attempts at more formal standardization were propagated by regional alliances. The Council of Europe
and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have supported pharmaceutical
standardization.53 The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the European Free Trade Area, and the
Nordic Council of Medicines each created shared testing and evaluation guidelines.54 From 1973 to 1978
Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands instituted a common system of drug registration, an experi-
ment that encouraged pharmaceutical companies to advocate increasingly for standardization of regulatory
regimes.55
More than any other step toward standardization, EC legislation on pharmaceuticals represented multi-
country regulatory consensus and demonstrated that such consensus was possible.56 The EU had been
working toward a common regulatory process for drugs as early as 1965.57 In 1965, directive 65/65 set the
stage for automatic mutual recognition of national drug marketing authorizations among member European
states. Action on the directive occurred in 1975, with the establishment of the Committee for Proprietary
51See id.
52See Walser, supra note 47, at 1642.
53See Kanusky, supra note 19, at 688.
54See id.
55See id.
56See A Brief History of ICH, at http://www.ifpma.org/ich8.html (visited on March 16, 2002).
57See Walser, supra note 47, at 1661.
13Medicinal Products (CPMP). The CPMP created a multi-state procedure for drug approval, in which the
CPMP served as a central clearinghouse for drug approvals submitted by any of the twelve member states
of the European Economic Union to any single European State. After approval was sought in any single
state, application could be made to as many as ﬁve states within the Union, and those States were required
to consider the approval in the initial state in conducting their own reviews.
However, because each state could reject a drug despite approval by the initial state of submission and almost
all submissions were denied general approval due to objections from member states, the CPMP system
eﬀectively added another layer of approval without any apparent beneﬁt in expediting market access.58
Changes to the CPMP system, allowing drug companies to apply for approval in a single and the CPMP
simultaneously, with applications to additional states granted unless the other states responded negatively
within ninety days, failed to remedy the situation of mutual distrust and stalemate.59
Real progress toward European mutual recognition only came with the 1987 centralized procedure for the
approval of biotech products, followed by the 1993 provisions of the European Commission authorizing the
creation of a European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA). The EMEA was endowed
with the power to grant marketing authorizations valid throughout the EU.60 The EMEA coordinates the
approval, manufacturing and inspection of medicines between the CPMP and regulatory bodies of member
states. Requests to the EMEA are forwarded to the CPMP, which issues an opinion within 210 days, subject
to the aﬃrmation of the European Commission’s Standing Committee on Medicinal Products for Human
Use. By allowing the acceptance of the CPMP to become ﬁnal unless the European Council acts within
ninety days of a rejection by the Standing Committee, the system facilitates approval and rejection by indi-
58See David V. Eakin, The International Conference on Harmonization of Pharmaceutical Regulations: Progress or Stagna-
tion? 6 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int’l L. 221, 224 (1999).
59See id.
60See Walser, supra note 47, at 1661-3.
14vidual member states is precluded.61
However, the legislatures of each member state have never been bound by EMEA decisions.62 National
legislatures cannot be bound by the decisions of the CPMP and the European Commission, which seriously
impedes the success of the system in reducing inspections and decreasing time to market. 63
Other than the EU standardization process, other early steps toward multinational pharmaceutical regulatory
cooperation were often bilateral, in the form of MOUs between two countries or organizations. Agreements
on good manufacturing practices existed in the late 1980s between the FDA and Switzerland, the FDA and
Sweden, and the FDA and Canada, and the FDA had separate agreements on good laboratory practices with
Canada, Sweden, Switzerland, West Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.64 In
1990, talks began between the FDA and the European Commission on good manufacturing and laboratory
practices applicable to EC members and the United States.65
After 1991, standardization attempts expanded into multilateral eﬀorts. In February 1991, at the Joint
Pharmacopeial Open Conference on International Harmonization of Excipient Standards, sponsored by the
United States, British, European, and Japanese Pharmacopeias, participants advocated for uniform reg-
ulation of excipients.66 Harmonization of health care product naming was the goal of a November 1991
conference sponsored by the United States, the EC, and Canada.67
Attempts at establishing global standards for pharmaceuticals were spurred in part by eﬀorts at reducing
barriers to global trade in general. In the past, eradicating trade barriers such as tariﬀs and quotas was the
main concern. Although these trade barriers have not been completely eliminated, the focus in international
trade has shifted in part to other barriers to trade, such as domestic production and manufacturing stan-
61See Eakin, supra note 58, at 225.
62See id.
63See id. at 225-226.
64See Kanusky, supra note 19, at 689.
65See id. at 688-689.
66See id. at 689.
67See id.
15dards. These standards encompass rules set voluntarily by industry and mandatory government guidelines,
both of which are enforced by conformity assessment bodies, either private or governmental, to certify that
the standards are being met.68 In many ways, the multilateralization of standards is the natural next step in
eliminating barriers to trade, as the cost of compliance with domestic standards and conformity assessment
procedures can be as prohibitive to international trade as tariﬀs.69
International agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (1993) and the
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT) (1994), which established the
World Trade Organization (WTO), signiﬁcantly advanced the movement toward uniform global standards,
by moving beyond routine tariﬀ-reduction measures.70 NAFTA and the WTO are permanent institutional
structures which address issues like domestic public health, food safety, consumer, worker and environmental
protection policies of member, all traditionally the purview of domestic government; as such, these bodies
go far beyond ordinary trade agreements focusing on tariﬀs and quotas.71 These agreements address the
establishment of domestic standards, with the intent of preserving the ability of a government to set national
standards, while preventing the use of such standards to favor domestic products unfairly.72 The WTO ad-
dresses this issue in its Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, and NAFTA does so in Chapter Nine on
Standards-Related Measures.73 Both restrict the domestic policy aims that member countries may follow, as
well as the tools to be used in implementing even acceptable domestic policy.74 Both agreements recognize
the right of countries to implement standards viewed as appropriate for the protection of public health, safety,
68See Allyson L. Senie and Kathryn E. Helne, Developments in the Multilateral Treatment of Standards, 1075 PLI/Corp
221, 224 (1998).
69See id. at 223-224.
70See Accountable Governance in the Era of Globalization: the WTO, NAFTA, and International Harmonization, at
http://www.harmonizationalert.org/HarmBackgrounder.htm (visited January 14, 2002).
71See id.
72See Senie and Helne, supra note 68, at 226-227.
73See id. See http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/final e.htm (visited March 17, 2002) for the full text of the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and http://www.mac.doc.gov/nafta/ch09.htm (visited March 17, 2002) for the full
text of Chapter Nine of NAFTA on Standards-Related Measures.
74See Accountable Governance, supra note 70.
16and the environment, provided that such standards will not be used to create unnecessary impediments to
trade. Unnecessary obstacles are assumed when standards making procedures are not open and transparent;
do not provide for public notice or comment by interested parties; do not involve publication of the ﬁnal
standard; and fail to establish a method by which aﬀected parties can ascertain the standards relevant to a
given product. Both also require and create feedback mechanisms on the eﬀectiveness of the agreements.75
In making inroads on standardizing what had previously been almost untouchable as exclusively within the
domain of domestic regulation, NAFTA and the WTO set the stage for the standardization movement in
the regulation of pharmaceuticals.
II. TOOLS OF STANDARDIZATION
There are various models by which countries may standardize their drug approval regimes, as well as various
mechanisms that can be adapted within the models to further standardization.76 These models include:
1) the agent-in-place model, in which a country is the recipient of a trading partner’s development work
and the country’s regulatory body relies on that information to assess compliance with U.S. law; 2) the
enforcement discretion model, in which the beneﬁt of the doubt, in the form of lessened scrutiny, is granted
to products of a country whose domestic regulatory requirements are deemed to be reliable; 3) the deputy
75See Senie and Helne, supra note 68, at 227-228. A Committee on Standards Related Measures (CRSM), composed of
government representatives from each party, implements the requirements of the standards chapter under the NAFTA agreement.
This Committee on Standards includes four subcommittees, each dealing with the harmonization of standards in either the
transportation, telecommunications, automobiles, or textile and clothing labeling sectors. The TBT Agreement establishes
a Technical Barriers to Trade Committee, consisting of representatives from each WTO member, so as to give members the
chance to communicate on matters relating to the TBT. The TBT Committee recently ﬁnished its ﬁrst triennial assessment of
the Agreement’s operation. See id.
76See Indech, supra note 1, at 367.
17sheriﬀ model, in which one country’s regulatory agency commits to accept another’s veriﬁcation of the
ﬁrst country’s domestic requirements;77 4) the equivalence model, in which a state accepts, in place of its
own standards, the regulatory requirements of another state;78 and 5) the harmonization model, in which
all involved countries simultaneously modify their regulatory requirements such that a common approach
results.79 All of these models play a role in the eﬀorts toward standardization.
Instruments which further these models include harmonization agreements, equivalence agreements, mutual
recognition agreements (MRAs), exchanges of letters, memoranda of understanding (MOUs), and procedural
agreements.80 In harmonization agreements, countries test products to the same international standards,
such that further testing is not required.81 The International Conference on Harmonization of Technical
Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH), which will be discussed in depth
later, is one such agreement. The member countries under the ICH still maintain their own approval processes
though.82 Under equivalence agreements diﬀerent regulatory systems are deemed equivalent by the parties,
despite not being identical.83 In MRAs, regulatory standards of an exporting country, although diﬀerent
from that of the importing country, are considered acceptable to the importing country if certain conditions
are met.84 No further testing would then be required upon importation from that country. Exchanges of
letters set out only the actions to be carried out by the letter’s signatory.85 They are used instead of formal
agreements when the actions to be taken are not signiﬁcant enough for a formal agreement and require
77For example, the United States would agree to accept another country’s veriﬁcation that goods made in that country comply
with United States’ law. While the substantive law to be applied is unchanged, the other country’s agent is deputized to apply
the law. See Merrill, supra note 45, at 135-136.
78In other words, the standards of the two countries are deemed functionally equivalent. See id.
79See id.
80See Practising Law Institute, The Commerce Department Speaks on International Trade & Investment, Developments in
the Multilateral Treatment of Standards, 1075 PLI/Corp 221, 225-226 (1998).
81See id.
82See Linda Horton, Mutual Recognition Agreements and Harmonization, 29 Seton Hall L. Rev. 692, 717 (1998).
83See Practising Law Institute, supra note 80.
84See id.
85See Department of Health and Human Services, International Memoranda of Understanding; New Compliance Policy
Guide;Availability, 60 FR 31485, 31486 (1995).
18only limited resource expenditure.86 MOUs, as discussed later, come in various forms and can be shaped
in various ways to meet the needs of the situation. Procedural agreements call for adherence to certain
processes when developing regulatory standards, regardless of lack of agreement on the resultant substantive
standards.87
Each instrument may be adopted in a range of manners, allowing for use in adherence with various models of
standardization. For example, the United States uses MRAs in furthering the equivalence model by requiring
equivalence prior to mutual recognition.88 However, MRAs could be structured to require recognition of
another country’s work without equivalence, adhering to the agent-in-place model of standardization.
Over the course of the ongoing drive towards standardization, all of these instruments have been used.
Use of one instrument embodying a distinct model of standardization has not meant the exclusion of other
instruments embodying diﬀerent models of standardization. For example, even while the ICH was being
developed, in 1994 the United States announced the conclusion of an MOU with Russia eﬀectively making
the FDA the regulatory body for pharmaceuticals in Russia.89
All of these instruments may be used both to arrive at stricter or looser standards. Under full harmonization,
all countries may agree on standards that are in line with the country with the most stringent regulatory
regime, the least stringent regulatory regime, or anywhere in between. Similarly, at what point the threshold
for equivalence is set will determine the rigor of the resulting regulatory regime. However, with equivalence
agreements there is the danger that a less strict regime that is deemed equivalent will serve as a means
for pharmaceutical producers to avoid the more rigorous controls in place in other countries, weakening the
86See id. As an example, an exchange of letters could cover an understanding that agencies will swap documents available
on request to members of the public. See id.
87See Practising Law Institute, supra note 80.
88See Indech, supra note 1, at 367.
89See Walser, supra note 47, at 1650-51.
19standard of protection rather than strengthening it as intended.90
A. Bilateral Eﬀorts: Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) and Memoranda
of Understanding (MOUs)
1.
Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs)
Generally, an MRA is a trade agreement under which non-tariﬀ barriers to trade are eliminated to facilitate
trade between the parties to the agreement.91 The overall goal of an MRA is to make trade easier without
compromising on levels of safety. MRAs generally involve either reliance on one another’s conformity assess-
ment system or exchange of results from conformity assessments to assure that requirements of the receiving
country are complied with where reliance on another’s results is not practicable.92 An MRA is a negotiated,
reciprocal agreement between two or more countries under which each recognizes the others’ conformity
assessment systems to be of a caliber such that some types of testing upon importation of pharmaceuticals
are unnecessary.93 Such agreements establish a framework of cooperation and trust between the involved
regulatory bodies. Evaluation, testing or inspection decisions of a regulatory authority in the exporter’s
jurisdiction are accepted by the importing country, as long as they are equivalent to those which would
have been made in the importing jurisdiction. The focus is thus on the capabilities and equivalency of the
procedures to reach the same decisions regarding testing, evaluation, or inspection, rather than on requiring
harmonization of regulatory requirements.94 Thus, even though other countries have much less extensive
90See Donahue, supra note 23, at 365-366.
91See Therapeutic Products, supra note 33.
92See Horton, supra note 82, at 715.
93See Accountable Governance, supra note 70.
94See Therapeutic Products, supra note 33.
20regulatory capacities than the United States, the U.S. may declare another country’s procedures “equivalent”
if the U.S. has conﬁdence that that country’s system will produce the same caliber of decision-making.95
As opposed to the more wide-reaching ICH, MRAs are generally tailored to solving a particular problem.
They are utilized most often to address situations in which a particular diﬀerence in regulatory regimes is
deemed a signiﬁcant barrier to trade.96 For example, the E.U.-U.S. MRA arose in part out of the US’s fear
of the EU becoming a fortress from which the US would be excluded. As a side beneﬁt, the MRA addressed
increasingly unmanageable enforcement burdens as well.97 Also, in opposition to the atmosphere of neutral
scientiﬁc curiosity that generally marks the ICH, MRAs often involve negotiations in which a spirit of com-
petitiveness prevails over cooperation.98
It is important to emphasize that MRAs do not substitute the substantive regulations of a foreign coun-
try for that of the country into which the goods are to be imported; rather they allow foreign bodies to
carry out the procedures by which adherence to domestic standards is ensured. Speciﬁcally, under an MRA,
the United States would permit foreign drug regulators to inspect that country’s drug manufacturers for
compliance with United States’ regulatory requirements, and the FDA would then treat these reports as if
they came from U.S. regulators.99 However, industry groups intend MRAs to be a step toward equivalence
and standardization, as they generally necessitate some determinations of equivalency.100 For example, the
US-EU MRA requires that both countries adhere to equivalent manufacturing standards as a prerequisite for
inclusion of products in the MRA.101 Even while emphasizing that the MRA did not involve harmonization
of drug regulations, the FDA described harmonization as a natural outcome of an MRA.102
95Although, such determinations by the U.S. raise the question as to why the U.S. requires more extensive regulation if it
determines that less stringent regulations are “equivalent” in producing decisions about pharmaceutical safety.
96See George A. Bermann, Regulatory Cooperation Between the European Commission and U.S. Administrative Agencies, 9
Admin. L.J. Am. U. 933, 964 (1996).
97See id.
98See id. at 966.
99See Accountable Governance, supra note 70.
100See id.
101See id.
102See id.
21In the United States, attempts to establish MRAs with other countries are headed by the U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative, with the involvement of the FDA for agreements on pharmaceuticals.103 Conformity assessment
systems ensure that a product meets with a given standard, through means such as product testing and
reporting on the results of quality tests.104 Thus, the regulatory agencies are relying on their counterparts
in the other countries to assess the conformity of drugs with safety and eﬃcacy requirements.105 Since
each party recognizes the trials and approvals issued by conformity assessment agencies of the other party,
products can be exported into the other party’s market without undergoing additional testing.
The United States initialed an MRA with the EU on June 20, 1997.106 The MRA entered into force on
December 7, 1998 with a three year conﬁdence-building period,107 after both parties completed domestic
requirements for adoption of the MRA.108 The MRA is composed of a general Framework Agreement sec-
tion laying out the rights and obligations of the parties, as well as sector-speciﬁc annexes, including one
on inspections in pharmaceuticals.109 It calls for mutual acceptance of products made at sites that have
passed inspection that adhere to international pharmaceutical manufacturing standards, known as Good
Manufacturing Practice (GMP), which ensure the purity and quality of the ﬁnal drug product.110 Under
the MRA, the FDA is to determine whether the regulatory systems of EU members are equivalent to that of
the US, after which those nations can import pharmaceuticals into the US without submission to the FDA
for further testing of products produced under GMP standards.111 The GMP Annex of the MRA deﬁnes
103See John Y. Chai, Medical Device Regulation in the United States and the European Union: A Comparative Study, 55
Food & Drug L.J. 57, 75 (2000).
104See Accountable Governance, supra note 70.
105See Chai, supra note 103.
106See Senie and Helne, supra note 68, at 229. The text of the MRA can be found at http://www.fda.gov/oia/ecmutual.htm,
visited on April 1, 2002. The EU also completed MRAs with Canada, New Zealand, and Australia at around the same time.
See Senie and Helne, supra note 68, at 229.
107See Indech, supra note 1, at n231.
108See Senie and Helne, supra note 68, at 229. In the U.S., consultations with Congress and industry groups, as well as an
FDA-mandated notice and comment period are required for adoption of an MRA. See id.
109See id.
110See John R. Schmertz and Mike Meier, European Union, Canada, and U.S. Conclude Mutual Recognition Agreements to
Facilitate the Sale of Certain Products in Each Other’s Markets, Int’l Law Update, 87 (1997).
111See Accountable Governance, supra note 70.
22equivalence as involving systems [that] are suﬃciently comparable to assure that the process of inspection
and the ensuing inspection reports will provide adequate information to determine whether respective statu-
tory and regulatory requirements of the authorities have been fulﬁlled;] Equivalence does not require that
the respective regulatory systems have identical procedures.112 Activities implicated in assessing equivalence
include exchanges of information, joint training, and joint inspections between the FDA and its EU Member
States’ counterparts.113 Equivalence determinations by both parties are to be made after the three year
transitional period, based on the evidence gathered during the transitional period.114 These assessments will
be carried out by a Joint Sectoral Committee, chaired by a representative of each party, and the Committee
will generate a list of equivalent authorities. In the pursuant operational stage, GMP inspection reports will
be exchanged between equivalent authorities, which in most cases will be endorsed by the receiving party.115
Eliminating the need for duplicating tests, inspections, and certiﬁcations is expected to bring a cost savings
of more than $1 billion each year to United States manufacturers, which amounts to the equivalent of a two
to three percent tariﬀ reduction.116
The FDA requires equivalence as a prerequisite to an MRA. As such, the FDA often uses MRAs to deepen
an already existing MOU relationship.117 MRAs generally specify the ongoing procedures by which the
countries will recognize the results of tests carried out by the other party’s regulatory body. An MRA sets
out the requirements a regulatory agency must meet for recognition, as well as the range of products to be
112See id.
113See Nick Littleﬁeld and Nicole R. Hadas, A Survey of Developments in Food and Drug Law From July 1998 to November
1999, 55 Food & Drug L.J. 35, 49 (2000).
114See Horton, supra note 82, at 727.
115See id. at 728-729. Under this procedure, the FDA still retains the possibility of rejecting such reports, although such
power is intended to be used only rarely, and thus the ultimate say on compliance. See id.
116See Charles Owen Verrill, Jr., Peter S. Jordan, and Timothy C. Brightbill, International Legal Developments in Review:
1997 Business Transactions, Disputes, and Regulation, 32 Int’l Law. 319, 326. (1998). This ﬁgure includes cost savings
accrued from all products covered by the MRA, not just pharmaceuticals. See id.
117See Horton, supra note 82, at 720.
23covered under the agreement.118 Equal access to markets is to be aﬀorded to all products covered by the
MRA. If barriers to such access arise, the parties must consult on how best to resolve the issue.119 In the
absence of resolution, the agreement may be dissolved by the complaining party after a certain amount of
time.
Given the highly technical nature of MRAs and the scope and nature of the negotiations they thereby re-
quire, such agreements are not optimal in all situations.120 fact, MRAs are only practical and eﬀective when
a trading relationship is one in which the nations have regulatory structures that are similar in scope and
structure, the countries have a signiﬁcant amount of trade in the particular industry to be covered, and
the standards diﬀerential has become a contentious trade issue between the nations.121 For an MRA to be
appropriate, the trading partners to be covered should both have regulatory systems that are similar in scope
and structure and should conduct a large amount of trade in the industry to be covered.122 Furthermore,
due to the scope and nature of negotiations involved in concluding an MRA, the standards to be regulated
should have become contentious issues.123
Even if these factors are present, an MRA may still encounter problems in implementation, such as those
already experienced with the EU-US MRA. The transitional period of the MRA had been marked by am-
bivalence. Because of the voluntary nature of the MRA, manufacturers can opt to use conventional FDA or
EU-equivalent inspections.124 The EU did not supply the US with a list of conformity assessment bodies
(CABs) until four months after the US submitted its own list of nominees. Additionally, CABs charge fees
based on the number of manufacturers it serves, and certiﬁcation of the EU CABs will cost the FDA about
$18 million in training.125
118See Chai, supra note 103, at 76.
119See id.
120See Senie and Helne, supra note 68, at 234 (1998).
121See id. at 234-235.
122See id.
123See id. at 235.
124See Littleﬁeld and Hadas, supra note 113.
125See id.
242.
Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs)126
Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) are another tool used in standardization of regulatory regimes. MOUs
are sometimes referred to as Notes Verbale or Arrangements. MOUs promote standardization of laws, regu-
lations, and enforcement actions.127 Like the other standardization tools, MOUs are intended to ensure the
safety and eﬃcacy of pharmaceuticals, to enhance eﬃciency of resource utilization, and to further commu-
nication between regulatory bodies on covered drugs.128
MOUs can be structured in various ways, depending on the nature of the parties’ systems and relationship.129
Not all MOUS are reciprocal and therefore do not always oﬀer the same beneﬁts to each side.130
One type of MOU that is most useful with countries having the same or similar systems oﬀering approxi-
mately the same level of protection is a reciprocal agreement setting up the mutual assessment of a foreign
regulatory system or measure’s comparability.131 These MOUs may be very similar to MRAs or equivalence
determinations, with the scope of activities covered ranging from mutual acceptance of data and inspec-
tion results to acceptance of the regulatory system such that the tests and inspections of imports may be
reduced.132 Several longstanding MOUs, for example those between the U.S. and Canada, and the U.S.
126Because MOUs can take a variety of forms, it is often unclear what the real diﬀerences are between MOUs and MRAs, and
this confusion is not resolved in the literature on standardization agreements. For example, no article spelled out the diﬀerent
areas in which an MRA would be used over an MOU and visa versa.
127See Department of Health and Human Services, supra note 85, at 31485.
128See Chai, supra note 103, at 77.
129See Department of Health and Human Services, supra note 85.
130See Horton, supra note 82, at 720.
131See Department of Health and Human Services, supra note 85.
132See id.
25and Sweden, have mutual recognition components, added after the FDA has determined that that the other
country’s regulatory system is of a caliber that the FDA can safely reduce inspections of products from that
country.133
MOUs may also cover certiﬁcation criteria for regulated products.134 In the past, these agreements have been
limited to products with inherent or consistent safety issues.135 More recently, they have been extended to
products with a good compliance history.136 This type of MOU can be used to direct the exporting country
as to what controls to use to ensure reliable and valid certiﬁcation, with the goal of reducing the need for
inspections and samplings upon import of the products.137
Yet another type of MOU establishes formal means of communication between signatories. Enhanced com-
munication facilitates the exchange of technical, regulatory, and scientiﬁc information, improving decision-
making by both parties and limiting resources needed for monitoring.138 Employees may also be exchanged,
as well as information. These MOUs are generally limited to a speciﬁc time period.139
There are several other varieties of MOUs. A cooperation MOU fosters cooperation and information-
sharing.140 A compliance MOU requires compliance of the exporting country with the standards of the
importing company. An equivalents MOU ﬁnds the regulatory system of another country equal to the
FDA’s.141
133See Horton, supra note 82, at 720.
134See Department of Health and Human Services, supra note 85.
135See id.
136See id.
137See id.
138See id.
139See Therapeutic Products, supra note 33.
140An example of such an MOU is an agreement signed by FDA and its counterparts in Canada and Mexico (Memorandum
of Cooperation in FDA International Cooperative Agreements Manual). See Horton, supra note 82, at 719.
141See Horton, supra note 82,at 719-720.
26The FDA has turned to MOUs in the face of increases in imports that need to be examined by the FDA.
Import shipments have increased from 500,000 in 1970 to 3,700,000 in 1996. The FDA negotiated MOUs to
have other countries take on the burden of ensuring that FDA requirements were met before the products
were sent to the U.S. As of 1996, the FDA had negotiated almost ﬁfty MOUs.142
In 1995, the FDA published a new compliance policy guide, “International Memoranda of Understand-
ing,” setting forth guidelines for initiating, developing, and monitoring MOUs between the FDA and with
other countries.143 These guidelines were developed at the recommendation of the FDA’s International
Harmonization Task Force, to explain the FDA’s aims in forging MOUs and to promote uniformity in the
establishment of MOUs.144 The guide stresses the need to maintain ﬂexibility in negotiating MOUs to
accommodate diﬀerent approaches to regulation.145
The FDA pursues MOUs with foreign governments or organizations when such agreements will advance the
state of domestic public health by improving FDA’s capacity to ensure the safety, quality, and eﬀectiveness
of products, allowing the FDA to capitalize on its resources most eﬀectively without compromising public
safety, and enhancing communications with foreign regulators.146 Particularly, the following factors are
considered in deciding whether to initiate MOU talks: health beneﬁts, including risk reduction, of products
and programs; to what extent a product is imported into the United States; the degree to which a proposed
agreement will remedy past compliance issues; the extent to which the costs of the program will outweigh
142See Sharon Smith Holston, An Overview of International Cooperation, 52 Food & Drug L.J. 197, 198 (1997).
143See Department of Health and Human Services, supra note 85.
144See id.
145See id.
146See id.
27the beneﬁts;147 the resulting reduction in industry’s regulatory burden; and the broader international policy
objectives of the United States.148
FDA negotiates MOUs pursuant to the Department of State’s Circular 175 procedures governing clearance of
Agency agreements with foreign powers.149 Before making equivalence determinations regarding procedures
and enforcement mechanisms of other parties, the FDA checks whether such procedures are in fact equivalent
in the level of safety and eﬃcacy they provide.150 On-site visits, among other techniques, are used to ascertain
whether the authorities, product standards, capabilities, and infrastructure of the foreign country make it
feasible for that country to meet the terms of an MOU.151 An MOU generally lasts for 5 years, during which
it is reviewed at least once to determine whether modiﬁcations are needed and if it should be continued or
cancelled.152
The FDA uses a three-phase process in developing an MOU with a foreign country, involving coordination
between the sponsoring center or oﬃce, the Oﬃce of Regulatory Aﬀairs (ORA), and the International Aﬀairs
Staﬀ/Oﬃce of Health Aﬀairs (IAS/OHA), and the Oﬃce of Policy (OP).153 First, the feasibility of such an
MOU is evaluated. The sponsoring center or oﬃce explains in writing to the ORA how the proposed MOU
would further FDA goals. The FDA determines whether the other party will be capable of carrying out
the proposed MOU, potentially through an exchange of information on laws, standards, and inspection
and sampling procedures and through on-site visits to various facilities. If the FDA decides that the other
147The goal is provide the greatest beneﬁt in relation to the resources required to administer a program. For example, the
costs of developing, implementing, and monitoring an agreement should be measured against the alternative, like the costs of
higher sampling levels to obtain the same degree of conﬁdence in rates of compliance in the absence of an agreement. See id.
at 31486.
148See Department of Health and Human Services, supra note 85, at 31486.
149See id. at 31485.
150See id.
151See id. at 31486.
152See id.
153See id.
28party does not have an adequate infrastructure to successfully participate in the MOU, a letter to that
eﬀect, approved by the OP and IAS/OHA, is sent to that party, and talks are suspended until the speciﬁed
concerns are addressed.154
Second, eﬀectiveness must be determined. Sometimes an informal conﬁdence-building trial period is con-
ducted under a draft MOU. The protocol detailed in the draft may include: a program description, infor-
mation about relevant government and private organizations’ roles and capabilities, possible certiﬁcation
issuance and use, procedures relating to audit time frames and metrics, and necessary training and informa-
tion. Regardless of the conduct of a trial, the FDA can use inspections, alone or with the other party, and
analysis of imported products to assess program eﬀectiveness.155
In the third stage, the substance of the MOU is ﬁnalized. Rulemaking is conducted if necessary. The MOU
is then ready for oﬃcial clearance. Procedures by which to audit the MOU are developed by the sponsoring
center or oﬃce and are disseminated to ﬁeld oﬃces by the ORA.156
The FDA MOU with Russia, announced by the FDA on February 14, 1994, eﬀectively makes the FDA the
regulatory body regarding pharmaceuticals for Russia.157 Under the MOU, the Russian Ministry of Health
is obligated to grant permission for the free marketing of U.S. pharmaceuticals within ninety days of the
provision of the applicant company’s ﬁnancial information, an FDA approval letter and package insert for
the product, a statement showing compliance with FDA GMP, and a copy of the FDA manufacturing facility
inspection report.158 No longer is further review or testing necessary and no translation of the underlying
154See Department of Health and Human Services, supra note 85, at 31486.
155See id.
156See id.
157See Walser, supra note 47, at 1650-1651. Controlled substances or highly addictive products must still be approved by the
Russian Federation’s State Committee on Controlled Substances. Additionally vaccines are subject to extra regulations. See
id.
158See id. at 1653-1654.
29data into Russian is required.159 This dramatically speeds up the entry of U.S. drugs into the Russian mar-
ket. Prior to this agreement, U.S. pharmaceutical companies often had to repeat animal and human clinical
trials, have all submitted papers, which often comprised over a thousand pages, translated into Russian, and
wait undeﬁned periods for approval decisions to be made.160 This would allow the United States a compar-
ative advantage in increasing its market share in the Russian pharmaceutical market.161 Furthermore, the
formal recognition of the worldwide esteem in which the FDA was held, was a boost to FDA self-esteem and
validation of the high-standards it claimed to uphold.162 Humanitarian concerns for getting treatments to
those that needed them in Russia were also cited.163
From the Russian viewpoint, the pact provided Russians with much needed pharmaceuticals that were in
short supply in Russia.164 The Russians also hoped that U.S. companies would hire Russian clinicians to
conduct lower cost drug trials in new facilities in Russia and that such a pact would promote joint ventures to
sell Russian products.165 Russia’s decision to essentially substitute the FDA for a domestic regulatory agency
can be viewed as a response to a weak domestic pharmaceutical industry,166 the quality problems suﬀered
by domestic drug producers, and the lack of resistance to such action from any internal community.167
Rather than sink limited resources into an expensive revamping of its own unsuccessful regulatory agency,
the Russian ministry of health ceded authority to the FDA. Furthermore, the MOU frees up limited Russian
resources to concentrate on other more problematic goods entering the country from other parts of the
159See id. at 1654.
160See id. at 1651.
161At the time, the Unites States accounted for only $7 million of the $350 million of drugs Russia imported. See id. at 1653.
162See Walser, supra note 47, at 1652.
163See id. at 1653.
164See id. at 1651.
165See id. at 1651-52.
166By 1995, foreign ﬁrms selling drugs already approved in their domestic markets made up about eighty-ﬁve percent of
Russian drug sales. See id. at 1652.
167See Walser, supra note 47, at 1652.
30world.168
B. Multilateral Eﬀorts: The International Conference on Harmonization of
Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use
(ICH)
1.
Goals of the ICH
The ICH was conceived at a conference between the regulatory oﬃcials of the EU, Japan, and the U.S.
and the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations (IFPMA) in 1989169 and
initiated in 1990 to achieve convergence of the pharmaceutical regulatory regimes of the U.S., the EU and
Japan.170 The project brings together representatives of the regulatory bodies of each of the three companies,
as well as industry experts from these countries, to discuss scientiﬁc and technical issues regarding drug
registration.171 Three government bodies, the European Commission; Japanese Ministry of Health and
Welfare; and U.S. Center for Drug and Biologics Evaluation and Research (an oﬃce of the FDA), and three
pharmaceutical industry trade groups, the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries Association;
Japanese Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association; and Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America comprise the ICH.172 The ICH is diﬀerent from other moves toward standardization, such as those
promoted by the WTO, as it has a recognized status and is supported by industry groups and regulatory
168See Horton, supra note 82, at 720.
169See Dan Kidd, The International Conference on Harmonization of Pharmaceutical Regulations, the European Medicines
Evaluation Agency, and the FDA: Who’s Zooming Who?, 4 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 183, 185 (1996).
170See Booth, supra note 8, at 203. As of 1994, these countries accounted for 75 percent of the world’s pharmaceutical market
and produce ninety percent of all pharmaceutical research. See Kanusky, supra note 19, at 767 (1994).
171See Welcome to the Oﬃcial Web Site for ICH, at http://www.ifpma.org/ich1.html, visited on January 27, 2002.
172See Accountable Governance, supra note 70. No consumer groups are included in the ICH, a critique I will expand on later
in this paper.
31bodies.173
The ICH is programmatic in that it contemplates a wide-ranging plan to address all areas of pharmaceutical
regulation in an institutionalized solution.174 The program is based on the notion that the core of drug
development is asking key questions and trying to answer them with studies that demonstrate to regulatory
authorities with a given level of conﬁdence the safety, eﬃcacy, and quality of the resulting products. This
principle, that drug development can be broken down into scientiﬁc principles and technical requirements to
which best scientiﬁc practice can be applied, suggests that the development of international standards for
pharmaceuticals is the logical outcome of adherence to such a principle.175 The goals of ICH, set out in a
statement by the ICH Steering Committee, are threefold.176 First, standardization is sought as a means to
avoid wasteful duplication in developing new drugs, without compromising levels of safety and eﬃcacy,177
or to ensure that “good quality, safe and eﬀective medicines are developed in the most expeditious and cost
eﬀective manner.”178 Speciﬁcally, standardization would reduce the need for animal, human, and material,
including monetary, resources.179 Second, ICH is intended to reduce the time to market of new drugs. Third,
ICH will maintain the levels of safety and eﬃcacy currently in place. ICH activities have also been touted
as means to reduce the spread of disease, both within and between countries, and to improve information
exchange between countries on health issues.180 In enacting these measures, the best interests of the patients,
173See Kanusky, supra note 19, at 691.
174See Bermann, supra note 96, at 961.
175See Caroline Nutley, supra note 29, at 2.
176In the Statement by the ICH Steering Committee “[t]he Parties cosponsoring th[e] Conference, represented at the 2nd
Steering Committee Meeting in Tokyo, 23-24 October 1990 re-aﬃrmed their commitment to increased international har-
monisation, aimed at ensuring that good quality, safe and eﬀective medicines are developed and registered in the most
eﬃcient and cost-eﬀective manner. These activities are pursued in the interest of the consumer and public health, to pre-
vent unnecessary duplication of clinical trials in humans and to minimise the use of animal testing without compromising
the regulatory obligations of safety and eﬀectiveness.” Statement By the ICH Steering Committee Tokyo, October 1990, at
http://www.ifpma.org/ich8.html, visited March 10, 2002.
177See Miller, supra note 11, at 228.
178See A Brief History of ICH, at www.ifpma.org/ich8.html visited July 29, 1999, cited in Indech, supra note 1, at 367.
179See Welcome to the Oﬃcial Web Site for ICH, at http://www.ifpma.org/ich1.html, visited on March 31, 2002.
180See Miller, supra note 11, at 228.
32public health, and the consumer are to be paramount.181
2. History of the ICH
ICH conferences have been held in Brussels, Belgium (ICH1) (1991), Orlando, Florida (ICH2) (1993), Yoko-
hama, Japan (ICH3) (1995), Brussels (ICH4) (1997),182 San Diego, California (ICH5) (2000),183 and ICH6
is planned for 2003.184 ICH1 produced a procedure by which to promulgate harmonization guidelines.185 A
Steering Committee composed of two representatives from each region plus two non-voting representatives
of the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations (IFPMA) was constituted to
direct and oversee all ICH activities, which in turn established a system of Expert Working Groups (EWGs),
joint regulatory/industry bodies, to establish priorities and draft guidelines.186 The ﬁrst phase of ICH, which
ended with ICH4 in Brussels, focused on decreasing duplication in the development process by standardizing
technical guidelines. The second phase focuses on consolidating, updating, and promoting the acceptance
of the Guidelines that grew out of the ﬁrst phase,187 as well as preventing future problems through early
collaboration on newly emerging issues.188
181See Indech,, supra note 1, at 368.
182See Booth, supra note 8, at 203.
183See ICH Global Cooperation Group, ICH Information Brochure, 5, May 2001, at http://www.ifpma.org/ichGCG.html,
visited March 31, 2002.
184See JPMA to prepare for ICH6 in Japan in 2003, 5/22/01 Chemical Bus. NewsBase 6, 2001 WL 21408934.
185See Buono, supra note 9, at 149.
186See id. at 149-150.
187See Holston, supra note 142, at 199-200.
188See ICH Global Cooperation Group, ICH Information Brochure, 21, May 2001, at http://www.ifpma.org/ichGCG.html,
visited March 31, 2002.
333.
Organizing Documents of the ICH
The ICH sets out its mission in the “Terms of Reference” under which it operates.189 Apart from ascertaining
where increased standardization could produce a more economical use of resources while maintaining quality
and safety levels, the ICH serves as a forum for regulatory agencies to converse constructively with industry
groups and to recommend practical steps toward standardization of the registration process.190 Rather than
ostensibly seeking harmonization of the regulations governing the approval process or a common application
process, the ICH aims to standardize the drug testing guidelines such that data produced therein would be
acceptable across countries.191 Achievement of ICH’s aims would obliterate the need for drug producers to
duplicate trials, while still requiring that each country’s application process be followed.192 Inevitably, a
quite similar regulatory process will result if ICH is successful.
4.
Structure of the ICH
The current ICH structure includes a Secretariat and Coordinators, in addition to the Steering Committee
and the EWGs.193 The Steering Committee currently has a representative from each of three observers, the
World Health Organization (WHO), Canada (represented by the Health Canada Drugs Directorate), and
189See Global Cooperation Group, Questions and Answers about ICH, 6, at http://www.ifpma.org/pdfifpma/GCGQ&A.pdf,
visited on January 27, 2002.
190See Buono, supra note 9, at 148-149.
191See Booth, supra note 8, at 204.
192See id.
193See Global Cooperation Group, Questions and Answers about ICH, 5, at http://www.ifpma.org/pdfifpma/GCGQ&A.pdf,
visited on January 27, 2002.
34the European Free Trade Area ((EFTA) represented by Switzerland), in addition to the original members to
provide input from non-represented states.194 The Steering Committee meets at least twice a year, rotating
locations among member regions. At these meetings, the Committee considers new topics for harmonization,
hears status reports on works in progress, and discusses maintenance of existing guidelines.195 Represen-
tatives from the generics industry, the over-the-counter (OTC) industry, and pharmacopoeial authorities
have been invited to some of the EWGs in recognition of their interest in the outcome of the ICH.196 In
March 1999, a subcommittee of the Steering Committee, the ICH Global Cooperation Group (GCG) was
formed to provide information on ICH, ICH activities, and ICH guidelines to any country’s regulatory au-
thority or any pharmaceutical company that requests the information. The subcommittee is constituted of
one representative of each of the six parties on the Steering Committee, the ICH Secretariat at IFPMA,
and observers from the WHO and Canada.197 The Secretariat, provided by the IFPMA and acting from
the IFPMA oﬃces in Geneva, supports the Steering Committee’s activities, with help from a coordinator
from each party. The Secretariat is funded by conference proceeds and industry contributions, while each
member funds its own participation in ICH activities, including travel expenses, special investigations, and
experiments. Five major conferences have been held apart from Steering Committee meetings, with the aim
of providing updates on ICH activities and assessing public opinion.198
194See id. at 8.
195See id. at 5.
196See Caroline Nutley, supra note 29, at 2.
197See ICH Global Cooperation Group, at http://www.ifpma.org/ichGCG.html , visited January 27, 2002.
198See Global Cooperation Group, supra note 183.
355. ICH Procedure
Topics for standardization are proposed by a party in a concept paper, which details the need for harmoniza-
tion and the proposed task and timetable of an EWG. If the topic is accepted by the Steering Committee,
an EWG is comprised to develop harmonization guidelines.199
At ICH conferences the parties engage in regulatory negotiation, also known as negotiated rulemaking, in
which parties aim to develop regulation guidelines on which all participants can agree.200 Cooperation is
intended to be placed above competition, as the participants engage in a neutral scientiﬁc inquiry.201 The
notice and comment period about the resulting compromise proposal should therefore be streamlined and
parties are less likely to challenge such a proposal in court once it has been accepted.202
The ICH process for generating standardizing proposals can be divided into ﬁve steps which are carried
out primarily by working groups between conferences.203 First, in the consensus-building stage, the Expert
Working Groups (EWGs) select and prioritize topics for standardization.204 The EWGs forward a draft
guideline, policy statement, or similar document to the Steering Committee.205 Second, regulatory action
starts when the Steering Committee determines based on the EWG report that there is enough consensus
to proceed and the members from each country regulatory group assent.206 At this point, proposed ICH
guidelines are published for comment on the ICH and member parties’ web sites.207 Third, during the regu-
latory consultation stage, each member regulatory agency has sixth months to exhaust its own consultation
199See id.
200See Booth, supra note 8, at 231.
201See Bermann, supra note 96, at 966.
202See Booth, supra note 8, at 231.
203See Bermann, supra note 96, at 963.
204See Miller, supra note 11, at 229.
205See Booth, supra note 8, at 205.
206See ICH Global Cooperation Group, ICH Information Brochure, supra note 183, at 17.
207See ICH Global Cooperation Group, Questions and Answers about ICH, supra note 189, at 8.
36procedure.208 Such consultation processes usually involve soliciting comments from citizens, academics, and
industry groups, among others.209 In the United States, proposed guidelines are published for comment
in the Federal Register.210 Comments from each agency are incorporated into the draft and passed to the
EWGs for approval before submission to the Steering Committee.211 At this stage, industry associations
and regulatory authorities in non-ICH regions have a chance to comment on the draft documents which are
distributed using IFPMA and WHO contact lists.212 A Regulatory Rapporteur is designated to meld the
drafts together and have the regulatory body representatives sign-oﬀ on the ﬁnal document.213 Fourth, the
Steering Committee adopts and recommends the ﬁnal version to all parties for their adoption.214 Fifth, the
parties incorporate the ﬁnal guidelines into their domestic pharmaceutical regulations.215
A guideline produced by the ICH is not binding on its members, as it lacks the force of a treaty or an
international accord. Rather, it represents a ﬁrm political commitment on the part of the concerned govern-
ments.216 For implementation of its guidelines, the ICH relies on their integration into domestic law by
the regulatory agencies of each country.
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212See ICH Global Cooperation Group, ICH Information Brochure, supra note 183, at 17.
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216See International Agreements: EC, U.S. and Japan Sign Commitment to Standardize Pharmaceutical Tests, 8 Int’l Trade
Reporter 1702, 1702 (1991). However, for such commitments to come to fruition, each country must integrate the ICH
guidelines into domestic law.
376. Progress of the ICH
Topics to be harmonized are classiﬁed as within the category of Safety, Quality, or Eﬃcacy, the three
criteria on which approval of new drugs is based, or Multidisciplinary.217 “Eﬃcacy” includes clinical testing
programs and safety monitoring, “Quality” includes pharmaceutical development and speciﬁcations, “Safety”
includes pre-clinical toxicity and related tests, and “Multidisciplinary includes topics eﬀecting more than one
area, such as regulatory communications, including electronic communication, medical terminology, timing
of toxicity studies in relation to clinical studies, and the Common Technical Document (CTD)). Eleven
guidelines have been published regarding Eﬃcacy, with three more in ﬁnal stages of development. Eﬃcacy
guidelines have the potential to be the guidelines with the most impact, since clinical trials are the most
resource intensive part of drug development. For example, with the implementation of “Ethnic Factors in the
Acceptability of Foreign Clinical Data” (E5) after its publication in February 1998, drug companies were able
to avoid repeated trials to account for ethnic diﬀerences across countries. Pﬁzer beneﬁted from this guideline
in its introduction of Viagra in Japan.218 However, the impact has been undermined by the U.S. and Japan’s
reluctance to accept data from other countries, with Japan in particular requiring extensive use of bridging
studies that are supposed to only be conducted in rare cases under E5.219 E5 has already been adopted by
some non-ICH countries, such as Taiwan and South Korea.220 The “Good Clinical Practice: Consolidated
Guideline” (E6), which underlies E5 by requiring adherence to the same rigorous clinical standards across
countries, has already eﬀected regulatory change in member countries. “General Considerations for Clinical
Trials” (E8), ﬁnished in July 1997, details internationally accepted principles of trial design, facilitating the
217See Caroline Nutley, supra note 29, at 2-3. See id. for a list of guidelines under consideration in each category, as well as
the texts and current stage of consideration of such guidelines.
218See Caroline Nutley, supra note 29, at 3.
219See Japan, U.S., but Not E.U., Are Slow to Accept Others’ Trial Data, 7/16/01 Eur. Drug & Device Rep. (Pg. Unavail.
Online) 2001 WL 15576169 Vol. 11, No. 14. Under the ICH guide, extrapolation of data from one region to other regions is
contemplated with limited use of bridging studies, trials to test whether ethnic diﬀerences eﬀect diﬀerential impacts of drugs.
See id.
220See id.
38acceptance of data across countries. 221 According to a 1997 ICH Utilization Survey, based on only seven
available Eﬃcacy guidelines, industry use of the guidelines in the EU 62%, Japan had 77% utilization, and
the US had 85% utilization, with industry reporting a positive impact on drug development programs.222
Speciﬁcally, industry responses noted that the guidelines facilitated intra-company globalization and some,
although not total, reduction of duplicate research.223
The fourteen ﬁnalized Quality guidelines focus on stability, speciﬁcations, and analytical methods evaluation.
Recommendations on stability data and impurities, two key areas of bulk drug and drug product quality,
have reduced the duplication of tests. For example, specifying a particular temperature at which to run
stability tests, rather than just conducting them at room temperature, eliminated the need for additional
tests for each climate.224 The 1997 ICH Utilization Survey, based on the 11 guidelines in this area then
completed, reported 77% average utilization and a reduction of duplication in reserach.225 The reported
regulatory issues were then addressed in revisions of the relevant guidelines.
Safety guidelines, covering all the major types of pre-clinical toxicity testing and focusing on standardizing
study length, content, species requirements, dose selection and
exposure levels to improve the risk/beneﬁt assessment, have increased the acceptability of the studies in
this ethically sensitive area. Standard batteries of tests have been developed for each type of toxicity study.
Utilization rates as of the 1997 survey, when seven guidelines had been implemented was 80.5% over the
three regions, with the EU reporting 77% utilization, and with Japan and the US both reporting 82%
utilization.226
221See Caroline Nutley, supra note 29, at 4.
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39The Common Technical Document (CTD) and the Medical Dictionary for Regulatory Activities Terminology
(MedDRA), a standardized terminology for the reporting of Adverse Drug Reactions, are the most important
and most ambitious Multidisciplinary guidelines. The CTD is a product of three EWGs promulgating a
single format for the technical section of a new drug dossier.227 The CTD, which creates a standard format
and content for new product applications, is the logical outgrowth of agreement on technical guidelines for
generating the reporting data.228 Currently, reformatting the submissions from U.S. to EU standards takes
two to six months, according to one study.229 This common document will dramatically reduce number of
man hours needed to take data and present it according to various countries’ requirements. The CTD is also
expected to lead to reductions in review times by regulatory agencies and hence faster times to market. An
e-CTD will further speed submissions.230
Several guidelines have been incorporated into domestic regulations of the member states, and the latest
survey data shows that the guidelines have reduced research duplication.231 These guidelines cover: 1)
reproductive toxicity in animals, 2) clinical studies in which the elderly are subjects, 3) testing the stability
of new active substances, 4) dose response information in support of drug registration,232 and 5) good clinical
practices, including preparing, monitoring, reporting, and archiving clinical trials.233 As of January 2000,
37 guidelines had been produced and are in the process of being implemented.234 The ICH is continuing
to maintain current guidelines, as well as develop new ones. The Common Technical Document, along with
its electronic version, is expected to allow multiple submissions to be replaced by one technical dossier for
227See id. at 8.
228See ICH Global Cooperation Group, ICH Information Brochure, supra note 183, at 5.
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40all three regions, encouraging simultaneous submission, approval and launch of new drugs. The ICH is
disseminating guidelines via its web site as well as the sites of members for use by other countries too.235
III. CRITIQUE OF THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARDIZA-
TION EFFORTS TO DATE
International standardization eﬀorts have been criticized in several respects. At the most general level,
the feasibility and desirability of standardization as an end goal has been attacked. More speciﬁcally, the
tools of standardization, multilateral and bilateral, have been denigrated. Some criticisms of the tools of
standardization echo the problems cited with the overall standardization process. However, some problems
are speciﬁc to the ICH and MRA processes as vehicles for standardization.236 I address both levels of
criticism in turn.
A.
Critique of Standardization as an End Goal
235See id. at 1.
236Criticism of particular tools of standardization focus on the ICH and MRAs. MOUs, perhaps because they are more limited
in scope, have not been speciﬁcally denigrated as a tool of standardization in the literature.
41The most fundamental critique of the standardization movement attacks the idea that standardization is the
desired outcome. Opponents of standardization argue that: 1) standardization is unattainable in a world
with cultural diversity; 2) standardization will only bring about a reduction in standard stringency; and 3)
standardization reduces government accountability to citizens.
First, critics contend that standardization is predicated on the notion that there is an attainable universal
standard. However, this may not be the case in the face of cultural and geographic diversity, giving rise to
diﬀerent levels of tolerable risk. For example, standard-setting takes into account objective variables, such
as use of a particular product, which vary by place and culture. Therefore, in a culture in which it is the
norm to take aspirin every day, the risk presented by the adverse eﬀects of aspirin will be much diﬀerent
than in a culture in which taking aspirin is shunned.237
Second, there is a fear that standardization will reduce international regulation to the level of the least
restrictive country. For example, the WTO and NAFTA instruct countries to use risk assessment, a process
by which a level of risk deemed tolerable is chosen, in setting standards. However, the United States often
chooses instead to base many regulations regarding pharmaceuticals on a policy of zero tolerance of a risk,
forbidding public exposure to a risk completely. A policy of zero tolerance is safer for consumers, but
problematic under NAFTA and the WTO.238 Therefore, the goal of standardization as a whole has been
criticized as undermining the safety of United States’ citizens.
International standards thus serve as a ceiling, rather than a ﬂoor; while provisions exist to challenge stricter
237See Accountable Governance, supra note 70.
238See id.
42standards, no such provisions exists to contravene those who fall below international standards. Under these
international regimes, members who deviate from international standards have the burden of proof to defend
stricter standards from charges of interfering with trade. Stricter domestic standards must pass a range of
tests to avoid being classiﬁed as trade barriers. The incentive under these regimes is to avoid setting safety
standards in excess of international standards, even if stricter standards would save lives. Fear of trade
sanctions that would interfere with lucrative international trade under the WTO and NAFTA thus impede
the development of novel solutions to public health issues. 239
Third, the development of global standards reduces the accountability of individual governments to their
citizens. Decision-making is removed from more accountable state governments to international bodies
largely inaccessible to citizens. These bodies determine the risk level that citizens are to live with in the
absence of signiﬁcant input from those aﬀected by the standards. Due to the inaccessibility of these agencies
to citizens, industry is able to exert a disproportionate inﬂuence on standard setting.240
B.
Critique of the Various Tools of Standardization
1.
Criticism of MRAs as a Tool for Harmonization
239See id
240 See id.
43MRAs have been criticized by business and consumers alike. Businesses are concerned that MRAs will not
properly protect proprietary information of pharmaceutical companies, and that such business secrets will be
disclosed to competitors through agreements dictating data-sharing between governments. For example, the
1997 US-EU MRA prescribes that the FDA has the discretion to claim conﬁdential status for certain data
that it submits to foreign governments for approval under the MRA. Yet, it is within the FDA’s discretion
to choose which data to mark as private. There is no eﬀective remedy for halting such disclosure, as once
the information has been let out any compensation is likely to prove inadequate.241
Consumers worry about the extent to which MRAs will lack consumer input. The equivalence determinations
made as part of MRAs will have a great eﬀect on which drugs are allowed into a market. Consumers often
have little impact on which regulations are declared equivalent. Few regulatory bodies solicit consumer
feedback in making equivalence decisions. The FDA, for example, does not request consumer comments and
makes equivalence determinations behind closed doors, in marked contrast to their policy of early notice
and comment with regard to food product equivalence determinations. Consumers also worry that they will
be denied access to the documents upon which equivalence assessments are made until after equivalence is
granted; if it is denied, all documents will be sealed. Availability of documents currently accessible by the
public might also be compromised under MRAs as not all foreign countries have Freedom of Information
acts or require recall information to be published as does the United States.242 When foreign inspectors take
on regulatory duties on behalf of the U.S. under MRAs, consumers worry that they will not be given access
to the resulting documents.
More basically, consumers are worried that safety standards will not be upheld given the existence of MRAs.
To prevent ﬁrms from seeking approval in countries with the least restrictions and then getting recognition of
241See James T. O’Reilly, Implications of International Drug Approval Systems on Conﬁdentiality of Business Secrets in the
U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, 53 Food & Drug L.J. 123, 125 (1998).
242See Accountable Governance, supra note 70.
44the decision in other nations, MRAs should only be concluded if regulatory systems are really equivalent.243
2.
Problems with the ICH as a Means of Standardization
There are many criticisms of the ICH process. Speciﬁcally the goals of the ICH, the inclusiveness of the
process, the scope of the issues to be standardized, and the pace of harmonization have all come under
attack.
The goals of the ICH and the metric used to assess progress is not clear. While success of the ICH seems to
be measured in decreased costs to the consumers and/or manufacturers, it is unclear that decreased costs will
be the result of standardization. If the United States succeeds in setting the safety level for pharmaceuticals,
countries worldwide will need to impose stricter regulations on drugs produced domestically to bring their
standards in line. These additional requirements will necessitate higher costs, as is evidenced by the increased
costs in the United States incident to each new FDA regulation.244
Likewise, a major goal of the ICH is to reduce time to market for drugs entering a new market. Standardizing
regulations would not necessarily accomplish this goal.245 The ICH is not intended to create a common
approval application. Even with the implementation of the Common Technical Document (CTD), only the
243See Dominguez-Urban, supra note 16, at 262-263.
244See Kidd, supra note 169, at 203-204.
245See id. at 186.
45form of submitting data will be standardized, not the data required.246 Therefore, producers still need to
comply with various approval application procedures in each market they wish to enter.247 There is the
danger that the ICH will become another layer of regulation to pass, another level of red tape to break
through, increasing the time from development to marketing.248
Echoing concerns about harmonization as a goal, consumer watch groups decry the lack of input from
interested individuals and aﬀected communities, which they claim results from industry-dominated working
groups that meet behind closed doors.249 Even though standardization can be beneﬁcial to both consumers
and producers, consumers and producers are not necessarily beneﬁted by the same types of standardization.
For example, while elimination of duplicative regulatory requirements reduces costs to producers, producers
may not pass these cost savings on to their consumers, and the elimination of some types of testing may
result in less safe drugs reaching consumers.
Although anyone willing and able to pay the registration fee can attend ICH conferences,250 no formal
mechanism exists to incorporate comments from the ﬂoor into the formal proceedings or to respond to such
comments.251 Beyond comments from the ﬂoor, there are no other means by which an individual not involved
in the ICH Steering Committee or EWGs can present his opinion.252 Further, although individual countries
publish draft ICH guidelines and ﬁnal ICH guidelines for comment pursuant to their internal regulatory
246See CDER, CBER, Guidance for Industry: Submitting Marketing Applications According to the ICH-CTD Format—
General Considerations (2001), at http://www.fda.gov/cber/ctd/ctdguid.htm, visited March 11, 2002.
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249See Harmonization, at http://www.harmonizationalert.org/HarmBackgrounder.htm, visited January 21, 2002. See also,
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212 n.68.
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46procedures, such feedback opportunity is not mandated by the ICH; draft guidelines only need be submitted
for consultation to the regulatory body of each participating country.253 If a given country’s procedure does
not require notice and comment, no public opinion is solicited.
With regard to the scope of the ICH, critics claim that there are a whole host of issues to be resolved
in the quest for international standardization that are not addressed by the ICH. The ICH deals mainly
with scientiﬁc aspects of pharmaceutical regulation.254 However, as mentioned in discussing problems with
standardization as an end goal, diﬀerences in cultural views of drugs must be confronted before a truly
global market is achievable. For example, Asian views toward medicine and health lead to unwillingness
to adhere to strict clinical testing protocols, leading Western nations to look upon the resultant data with
skepticism. As another example, Americans are unwilling to accept any risk in pharmaceutical products.
The ICH also fails to deal with the political and economic forces that inﬂuence the regulatory bodies in
various countries.255 These issues have been impediments to harmonization of drug regulations across the
EU, a less heterogeneous cultural and political area than the three ICH regions.256
The pace of implementation is another concern. Since the guidelines produced by ICH do not have the
binding force of treaties, there is no mechanism for implementation other than each country pursuing its
usual procedures for adopting regulations. As such, there is fear that implementation will be extremely
slow.257 Also, the lack of enforcement power in the central ICH institutions create a vacuum which may be
253The FDA regulations do require publication of notice in the Federal Register and invites comments prior adoption of ICH
guidelines. See id.
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47too tempting for member states to try and ﬁll. Political wrangling and regional distrust would subvert the
drive towards a faster drug approval process that optimally protects consumers.258
Speciﬁcally, some fear that the ICH will be plagued with the same problems that faced the EU’s attempt to
centralize and standardize its drug regulations. The EMEA, the EU’s regulatory body for pharmaceuticals,
is tasked with facilitating harmonization, not imposing it. Likewise, the ICH is envisioned as a provider of
the infrastructure for cooperation. The fear is that the ICH will have just as much diﬃculty as the EU in
getting countries to implement common procedures absent binding authority. While the EU might be forced
to grant decision-making power to the EMEA, it is highly improbable that that would be an option for the
ICH.259
IV. THE FDA AND STANDARDIZATION
A.
FDA’s Attempts to Facilitate International Standardization
Within the United States, Congress has recognized that the imperative nature of increased eﬃciency in the
drug approval process is as important as maintaining proper safety precautions.260 In the “ﬁndings” section
of the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA), legislation intended to speed
up the drug approval process, Congress acknowledged that prompt approval of safe and eﬀective new drugs
258See Eakin, supra note 58, at 222.
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260See Littleﬁeld and Hadas, supra note 113, at 35.
48and other therapies is critical to the improvement of public health, so that patients may enjoy the beneﬁts
provided by these therapies to treat and prevent illness and disease.261
The FDA has been tasked by Congress with facilitating international standardization of pharmaceutical
regulations. In section 410 of the FDAMA, Congress mandated that the FDA pursue standardization.262 In
this legislation, the FDA is called on to support the Oﬃce of the United States Trade Representative... in
meetings with representatives of other countries to discuss methods and approaches to reduce the burden of
regulation and harmonize regulatory requirements if... such harmonization continues consumer protections
consistent with the purposes of this Act.”263 The FDAMA added two objectives to the FDA’s mission: to
participate... with representatives in other countries to reduce the burden of regulation, harmonize regulatory
requirements, and achieve appropriate reciprocal arrangements; and to carry out [its mission] in consultation
with experts... and in cooperation with consumers, users, manufacturers, importers, packers, distributors,
and retailers of regulated products. 264
The FDA itself has manifested its commitment to international standardization through increased coopera-
tion with the standardization process.265 The FDA leadership council recently added international consul-
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Global Harmonization of Regulatory Requirements for Premarket Approval of Autologous Cell Therapies, 55 Food & Drug
L.J. 225, 239-240 (2000).
26321 USCA § 383, cited in Ward, supra note 262, at 240.
26421 U.S.C. § 393 (FDAMA § 406 (amending FDCA § 903)), cited in Linda A. Suydam and Milan J. Kubic, FDA’s Im-
plementation of FDAMA: An Interim Balance Sheet, 56 Food & Drug L.J. 131, 131 (2001). Similarly, in a recent CDER
Mission Statement the FDA is urged to [p]articipate through appropriate processes with representatives of other countries to
reduce the burden of regulation, harmonize regulatory requirements, and achieve appropriate reciprocal arrangements. FDA,
CDER 1998 Report to the Nation, inside cover (1998), cited in Ward, supra note 262, at 240.
265See Eakin, supra note 58, at 222. Various motives have been posited for the increasing cooperation by the FDA in
international standardization. Factors such as agency resource constraints, increased international trade of drug products, and
political pressure exerted through mandatory trade agreements have been cited as driving FDA action. See id. Additionally,
FDA actions have been attributed to FDA’s fear of losing its dominant position internationally in pharmaceutical regulation.
Given its position as the regulator of the largest homogeneously regulated pharmaceutical industry and market, the FDA’s
regulations have served as the basis for development and testing plans by producers. However, with the emergence of the
even larger EU market regulated by the EMEA, there is the danger of EMEA regulations becoming the standard on which
testing programs are based. If this were to occur, the pace of approval of drugs for the U.S. market would be further slowed in
49tation and cooperation to the ﬁve fundamental principles of FDA’s public health mission.266 The FDA also
published a Policy on Standards regarding the agency’s standardization eﬀorts,267 in which it acknowledged
that it must adhere to international standards in its domestic regulations, unless those standards are inef-
fective or inappropriate.268 The Policy emphasizes the importance of openness, transparency, and public
involvement procedures for standard-setting in which the FDA is to participate.269 Furthermore, as of 1997,
the FDA had published over ﬁfty notices regarding draft ICH guidelines and other harmonization-related
issues.270
To further the imperative of international standardization, the FDA has followed the suggestion of the Presi-
dent’s Council on Competitiveness that the FDA increasingly rely on foreign data, and loosened its approval
requirements to allow approval after the completion of one domestic clinical trial by an investigator trusted
by the FDA.271 The FDA thus acceded somewhat to the drive for acceptance of the products of foreign
regulatory systems while still ensuring the safety and eﬃcacy of proposed drugs.272
The FDA has also testiﬁed before Congress in support of standardization eﬀorts.273 For example, to alleviate
the absence of standardization, as drugs developed to accord with EMEA guidelines would be subjected to additional testing
before entering the U.S. market. The FDA might be engaging in standardization as a means to head oﬀ this increase in an
already-criticized lengthy time to market. See Booth, supra note 8, at 207.
266See Suydam and Kubic, supra note 264, at 131. The other objectives of the FDA are: 1) a timely review of regulated
products, 2) the protection of public health by ensuring that food and cosmetics are safe and properly labeled, 3) ensuring that
human and veterinary drugs are safe and eﬀective, 4) providing a reasonable assurance of the safety and eﬀectiveness of medical
devices, and 5) public protection from electronic product radiation. See id.
267See Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration International Harmonization; Policy on
Standards, 60 FR 53078-01 (1995). This document covers all standardization eﬀorts, including those for food, the Codex
Alimentarius Commission and the Food Chemicals Codex, and the ICH. See also Booth, supra note 8, at 208-209. The Policy
states that the FDA’s participation in the ICH is covered by Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 10.95, which
provides mandatory standards for FDA participation in outside standards-setting activities. See id. at 211.
268Booth, supra note 8, at 209. However, the Draft Statement does not deﬁne criteria for deciding when standards are
ineﬀective or inappropriate. See id.
269See id. at 210.
270See Booth, supra note 8, at 205-206.
271See Miller, supra note 11.
272See id.
273That such testimony should be necessary is surprising given Congress’ commitment to standardization as manifested
in acts such as FDAMA. See text accompanying notes 260-264 for further examples of Congress’ professed commitment to
standardization. However, the House Commerce Committee, which oversees the FDA, has questioned the advisability of MRAs
due to worries that MRAs will allow into the U.S. drugs approved under less exacting regulations than those imposed by the
FDA. The Committee’s concerns are at least in part a reﬂection of their constituents’ zero tolerance for risk. Congress also
does not want to be perceived as putting trade revenues above public health. See also Eakin, supra note 58, at 229.
50fears about the advisability of U.S. commitment to MRAs, the FDA stressed in testimony before the House
that the FDA initiated the drive toward shared inspections with the Europeans and that the FDA is not
compromising its standards.274
B. Critique of FDA Participation in International Standardization
Despite the abovementioned actions on behalf of the FDA, some people still feel that the FDA is not taking
appropriate action to facilitate standardization. The FDA has been criticized for its failure to wholeheartedly
pursue international standardization. The FDA justiﬁed its reluctance to accept completely the results of
foreign trials by citing the less detailed judgment and measurement of eﬃcacy in foreign research protocols,
the lack of familiarity of foreign researchers with close monitoring through recorded data, the reluctance
of esteemed foreign researchers to follow guidance from sponsors, the cross-cultural diﬀerences in human
interpretation of statistical norms and computer programs, the inclusion of less data in trial reports in other
countries, and the lack of conviction of foreign companies in FDA standards.275
In all manifestations of its pursuit of standardization, including conclusion of MRAs; signing of MOUs; and
participation in the ICH, the United States and the FDA have been criticized by adherents of standardiza-
tion. Generally, U.S. and FDA participation is denigrated as superﬁcial attempts to maintain power over
international standard-setting regarding pharmaceuticals. For example, one commentator observed that it
appeared to the EU at times that what ’MRA’ meant to the U.S. was ’my regulations apply.’ 276 Similarly,
critics decry the MOUs the FDA has entered into as just another means for the FDA to exert control over
other markets, exporting its own standards rather than working towards standardization.277 FDA’s pursuit
274See Eakin, supra note 58, at 229.
275See Miller, supra note 11, at 235.
276See Eakin, supra note 58, at 229.
277See id. at 228.
51of MOUs with individual countries has been criticized as a means by which the FDA can say it is pursuing
standardization, while still dictating the terms of inspection and safety levels.278 These claims are buttressed
by the reality that under MOUs, the FDA’s involvement in foreign regulations increases, as often foreign
inspectors need training to be able to implement FDA standards abroad.279
Furthermore, critics claim that the FDA would prefer that it be in charge of standardization in place of
the ICH or other international bodies.280 In line with that allegation, the FDA has been charged with not
allocating suﬃcient resources to participation in the ICH, instead having employees work on ICH issues in
addition to their other responsibilities.281 Such staﬃng is said to be in line with the feeling of some people
within the FDA that standardization takes away from the primary goal of the FDA of drug review.282
The actual process that the FDA uses to implement ICH guidelines has also been attacked. Criticism that
the ICH process does not allow for enough input by aﬀected parties other than government and industry
groups has also been levied against the FDA in its procedure for adopting ICH guidelines. Although the
FDA publishes draft guidelines for notice and comment before adopting the guidelines and then publishes
the ﬁnal guidelines for comment, this procedure has been decried as inadequate to allow for consumer input
in the situation. The four to twelve weeks allowed for comments on the draft guidelines has been deemed
inadequate for anyone not intimately involved in the development of such complex guidelines to master them
to the degree necessary to comment intelligently on them. Such a process therefore only gives the illusion of
soliciting input by aﬀected parties not involved in the ICH conferences, while in reality such input is denied.
This lack of actual input is exacerbated by the ICH protocol in which all substantive work on the guidelines
are completed before the draft is published by the FDA. So even if comments were to be received by the
278See id.
279See Kidd, supra note 169, at 200.
280See id.
281See id.
282See id. at 202.
52FDA, the mechanism by which they might be incorporated into the ICH guidelines remains unclear.283 Thus,
consumer groups, and to a more limited extent the OTC industry, are eﬀectively bound by regulations in
which they have no say.284
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The international standardization of pharmaceutical regulations has the potential to beneﬁt consumers and
producers worldwide. However, unless certain impediments, detailed above, are overcome, the beneﬁts
of standardization may never be fully realized. Speciﬁcally, the various tools of standardization must be
integrated into a cohesive system, input must be solicited from a broader spectrum of interested parties, and
mechanisms for enforceability must be established.
Although mutual recognition and harmonization can be seen as complements, rather than as mutually ex-
clusive, countries must be careful that these instruments do not work at cross purposes. Mutual recognition
allows approval for sale of a product made to a harmonized set of speciﬁcations solely upon certiﬁcation in
the exporting country. Mutual recognition alone though, fails to provide one-step approval for multiple mar-
kets without harmonization or equivalence determinations. 285 Due to this complementarity, even members
of the ICH have continued to pursue MRAs. For example, Japan and the EU concluded an MRA eﬀective
283See Booth, supra note 8, at 216.
284See id. at 217.
285See Community External Trade Policy in the Field of Standards and Conformity Assessment, 10-11, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/pdf/mra1.pdf), visited on April 3, 2002.
53January 1, 2002, which requires them to recognize mutual safety and reliability certiﬁcations of manufactured
goods in the pharmaceutical, telecommunications, chemicals, and household electrical appliance industries.
Negotiations over this MRA were ongoing since the mid-1990s, the same period in which the ICH was being
implemented.286
Despite their complementarity, MRAs can undermine harmonization. For example, critics of the FDA have
accused it of using MRAs to extend its regulatory hegemony over the markets of other countries. If this is
indeed the case, and the FDA is using MRAs in part to increase its worldwide power, such behavior will serve
to undermine the eﬀorts of the ICH, which are predicated on a group of equals working together. To avoid
such a situation, it is important to ensure that MRAs, MOUs, and the ICH be coordinated in a cohesive
system, perhaps under the larger rubric of the ICH structure.
Another way in which international standardization can be facilitated is through the broader solicitation of
input on both the domestic and international level. As detailed above, complaints about the lack of opportu-
nity to impact the standardization eﬀort have been levied against domestic participation in standardization
as well as against the international procedures.287 Consumers and countries outside the ICH system feel
that decisions are being made that aﬀect them without consideration of their input on the issues.
Lack of input by aﬀected groups will hamper the public acceptance necessary for the international standard-
ization process to forge ahead. Domestically, although the FDA can force regulations on the public to some
extent, opponents are not without weapons. Legal challenges and the manipulation of public opinion can be
aﬀective tools of slowing down implementation of the fruits of the ICH. By allowing more input of aﬀected
groups into the process, the FDA would build public conﬁdence that safety standards were being maintained
and would serve to deter legal challenges to the U.S. adoption of ICH guidelines.288 On an international
286See Japan, EU exchange notes on product certiﬁcation, Japan Wkly. Monitor (Pg. Unavail. Online) 2001 WL 29458616
(2001).
287See text on pp. 49-50 and 56.
288See Booth, supra note 8, at 223.
54level, cultural diﬀerences that would hamper the applicability and acceptance of international standards
could be dealt with by soliciting opinions of diverse countries in the process of creating the standards.
The creation of enforcement mechanisms is a third major way by which international standardization can
be facilitated. Development and implementation of MOUs, MRAs, and ICH guidances are slow. Currently,
all standardization activity is on a voluntary basis, and the resulting agreements are non-binding. Going
forward, it will be important for standardization activities to be encapsulated in a multilateral treaty with
binding force. There should be a dispute resolution mechanism too, to address issues that arise. The “polit-
ical commitments” currently in place need to be given the force of law. A possible model for an enforcement
system would be that of Codex, which coopts the WTO dispute settlement process.
VI. CONCLUSION
As detailed above, eﬀorts at standardization are intended to beneﬁt consumers and pharmaceutical producers.
Elimination of duplicative requirements is intended to allow consumers faster access to new treatments at
lower cost while still ensuring product safety. Producers will be able to cut costs by reductions in the costs
of compliance with multiple regulatory structures and increase proﬁts by reducing time to market. These
eﬀects are mutually enforcing in many ways; if the cost of producing drugs is decreased with the reduction
of regulatory requirements, producers can charge less for medicines or allocate some of the money saved to
research and development.
Globalization is happening. Standardization of pharmaceutical regulations is progressing under the status
quo of MRAs, MOUs, and the ICH. However, the pace of standardization is relatively slow. MRAs and
55MOUs are piecemeal tools that bring about incremental change. While the ICH is more programmatic and
encompasses the three major pharmaceutical producing countries, it provides a cumbersome, slow-paced
process, that produces standards that are ultimately unenforceable.
To increase the pace of standardization, the MRA and MOU models need to be incorporated into the ICH
and the ICH needs to be made binding on the parties. Furthermore, increased participation by non-member
nations and consumer groups will facilitate acceptance of the results of the standardization process. The way
in which Codex standards are given teeth through the WTO is a possible example of a way to make ICH guid-
ances binding on member states. Adopting these recommendations will allow the international community
to reap more rapidly the full beneﬁts of international standardization of pharmaceutical regulations.
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